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Introduction
The potential tax opportunities for Australian state
governments to broaden their tax bases can be illustrated
by comparing the revenue raised by the current tax
system with that of a sensible tax system (the tax gap).
A number of tax enquiries have set out the general
outline of a sensible tax structure. For examples, see the
Asprey Report1 and the Draft White Paper,2 and more
recently, the UK’s Mirrlees Review3 and Australia’s
Henry Review.4 Such a sensible tax system allows the
government to raise revenue and redistribute in the most
efficient, fair and simple way.
Under a sensible tax system it is necessary to spread
the revenue base over a number of taxes, because the
higher the tax rate on a particular tax, the higher the
incentive to get around the tax rules. Also, there are
limited ways you can redistribute if there is only one tax
(eg, only a GST), so income and wealth taxes are
needed. However, having 125 different Australian
Government taxes produces excessive complexity and
costs to the community. It is apparent from the above
reviews that a sensible tax structure consists of far fewer
and broader taxes that need to work in harmony together
(as well as integrate with the social security benefit). A
sensible tax structure should be generally aligned with
comprehensive tax bases and the following package of
seven taxes.
A sensible tax system
Broad progressive income tax
There is a plethora of complex tax concessions in the
current progressive income tax system that allows exces-
sive tax minimisation and tax avoidance, and appears to
encourage tax evasion. This is unfair and favours certain
types of economic activity over others. Such conces-
sions also undermine fiscal adequacy.As Richard Edmonds J
noted, the trade-off for Australia’s high tax-free thresh-
old and the steep increase in rates after the tax-free
threshold is that Australia’s effective marginal tax rates
are comparatively high vis-à-vis other countries with
similar tax systems.5 The judge considers that the calls
for broadening the base of the GST without broadening
the base of the income tax and reduction of its high
marginal tax rates “is not only politically flawed and
unlikely to succeed, but is inconsistent with the gener-
ally accepted criteria or design principles which should
drive the structure of the tax system”.6
A broad-based income tax is preferred. Such a tax
system treats similar economic activities in similar ways
for tax purposes, it is simpler and helps to minimise
economic distortions. All expenses incurred in produc-
ing the income would be deductible. Taxable income
from all sources would be taxed according to the same
tax rate structure.
A fair tax system should also feature a progressive tax
rate structure.7 Progressivity carries out a vital redistri-
bution role but also involves a loss of efficiency, as the
behaviour of both poor and rich is affected. It is
important to design a progressive tax rate structure to
minimise the loss of efficiency.
A single rate of company income tax should also be
employed. There should be equal treatment of income
derived from employment and self-employment and
from operating a small company. However, there is an
international shift away from dividend imputation,8 with
Australia and New Zealand being the only two Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
economies using imputation. As the Australian economy
has become more open, the benefits of dividend impu-
tation have declined. Consequently, alternatives to divi-
dend imputation should be considered.
There are only a few exceptions from a broad income
tax base.9 Since people tend not to save adequately for
their retirement, and with an ageing population, it is
important to offer limited encouragement for individuals
to provide for their retirement so as to prevent reliance
on expensive government age pensions.10
A broad single rate GST
The current GST system provides:
• concessional GST-free rates;
• input taxes supplies and exempts large amounts of
consumption;
• promotes complexity;
• distorts consumption decisions; and
• unfairly impacts on consumers with different pat-
terns of consumption.
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Exemptions prevent businesses from claiming GST
paid on their inputs; this distorts production decisions.
As the Henry Review notes:
… the GST is an efficient tax relative to most other taxes
levied in Australia, it is less efficient than it could be
because of its failure to tax consumption on a truly
comprehensive basis[.]11
A GST should be applied to all final consumption
expenditure by households. Expenditure on business
inputs, though, should be untaxed, with businesses able
to be refunded GST charged on their inputs. This
involves a single GST rate with minimal exemptions (a
GST on financial services is unpractical). However, an
economically equivalent tax to the GST should be
applied to financial services.12
Removing the exemptions on basic necessities of life
would greatly increase tax revenue but be very regres-
sive on low income earners. This impact though must be
offset by a combination of income tax cuts and perma-
nent increases in means-tested social security benefits
that are indexed for inflation to ensure a revenue-neutral
outcome.
Additional taxes on illegal drugs, tobacco,
carbon and gambling
Additional taxes are economically justifiable on cer-
tain harmful activities such as:
• illegal drugs;
• tobacco and junk food consumption;
• gambling; and
• activities that damage the environment.
Gambling taxes should recoup the economic rent
generated by government restrictions on the supply of
gambling services or be used efficiently to impose such
restrictions.13 The regressive impact of environmental
taxes on power costs must be recognised through adjust-
ments to the means-tested social security benefits that
are adjusted for inflation and income tax rates.
Land tax
There are great efficiency benefits of a broad land tax,
and thus, such a tax should replace all existing stamp
duties and other transactional taxes on land and build-
ings.14 To aid equity, an increasing marginal rate sched-
ule should be applied according to the per-square-metre
value. The Henry Review found:
Stamp duties on conveyances are inconsistent with the
needs of a modern tax system. While a significant source of
State tax revenue, they are volatile and highly inefficient
and should be replaced with a more efficient means of
raising revenue.
Conveyance stamp duty is highly inefficient and inequi-
table. It discourages transactions of commercial and resi-
dential property and, through this, its allocation to its most
valuable use. Conveyance stamp duty can also discourage
people from changing their place of residence as their
personal circumstances change or discourage people from
making lifestyle changes that involve a change in resi-
dence. It is also inequitable, as people who need to move
more frequently bear more tax, irrespective of their income
or wealth.15
Transfer of wealth tax
Taxing the transfer of wealth from one generation to
the next has the potential to lessen the inequality of life
chances between children, due to the accident of their
birth. Efficiency and equity are enhanced through a tax
on such transfers.16 All assets transferred on death or
during the donor’s lifetime should be subject to tax.
Uniform resource rent tax
The resource taxes on royalties distort investment and
production decisions, and this reduces the community’s
return from its abundant resources.17 Additionally, they
do not collect an adequate return for the community,
because they are unresponsive to changes in profits.
Such taxes collected a declining share of the return to
resources over the recent period of increasing profitabil-
ity in the resource sector.
The Henry Review recommended a uniform resource
rent tax that should be applied on taxable profit associ-
ated with a resource project equal to net income less an
allowance for undeducted expenses or unused losses.18
The allowance rate would be set by the long-term
government bond rate, as the government would share in
the risks of projects by providing a loss refund if the tax
value of expenditure is otherwise unable to be used.19
Road congestion tax
The heavily congested parts of the road network
impose high costs on the community.20 As the Henry
Review recommended, transparent congestion charges
should apply to all registered vehicles using congested
roads.21 The regressive impact of such taxes must be
recognised through adjustments to the means-tested
social security benefits that are adjusted for inflation and
income tax rates.
Setting tax rates
The current income tax rate structure on salary and
wage earners reduces employment and earnings more
than necessary. A broader tax base can deliver appropri-
ate tax rates for the above taxes and the degrees of
income tax, wealth tax and land tax progressivity.
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Quantifying the tax gap
The tax gap can be estimated by comparing the taxes
raised by all Australian governments with the tax pro-
duced by a sensible tax system. In the absence of any
known estimates of this tax gap, the following two-part
estimate is made for 2014–15.
Commonwealth’s annual tax expenditures
The Commonwealth estimated the annual tax expen-
ditures for 2014–15 for a limited range of tax conces-
sions as follows:22
Commonwealth tax expenditures 2014–15 $ billion
Taxing all capital gains of residents 61
Concession of non-superannuation termination
benefits
2
Capping the superannuation concession to
$5 billion
25
Research and development tax offset 1
Capital works deductions 1
Family tax benefit exemptions 23
Child care assistance 1.4
Interest withholding tax exemption 1.7





• child care; and
• water.
Total 116.8
As set out above the Commonwealth finds that this
broader definition of income tax and GST could raise an
additional $117 billion.
Additional revenue from a broader sensible tax
system
A sensible tax system, however, would further extend
the tax base to include other free riders as follows:
Additional revenue from a broader
sensible tax system 2014-15
$ billion
Income and wealth taxes
Estimated capital gains tax on realisations on a
total of $3 billion of foreign investments in
Australia23
14
Capping negative gearing at $10,00024 1.5
Broader company tax on multinationals25 6
Wealth tax at 2.5% of tax base26 11
Tax on externalities
GST of 30% on sugary drinks and fast food27 4
Carbon tax set at former 2014 tax rate of
$24.15 per tonne of carbon28
12
Road transport congestion tax 2
Doubling gambling taxes29 7.6
100% GST on illegal drugs30 17
Additional revenue from a broader
sensible tax system 2014-15
$ billion
Taxes on use of community resources
Alberta, Canada style royalty scheme on oil and
gas31
11
Resource super profits tax on minerals32 9
Bank liability taxes33 2
Total 97.1
Conclusion
Including the governments’ stated tax expenditures of
$117 billion, it is estimated that taxing free riders in
2014–15 provides a potential state government revenue
opportunity of an estimated $214 billion in 2014–15, or
about 50% of the total revenue raised by all Australian
state and territory governments. While the states are
subject to the constraint in s 90 of the Commonwealth of
Australia Constitution Act 1900 (prohibiting states from
imposing duties of customs and excise) and s 109
(Commonwealth law prevails over an inconsistent state
law), the states nevertheless have a significant concur-
rent ability to tax (along with the Commonwealth) under
the Constitution. The Commonwealth’s dithering on
addressing the tax gap offers the prospect for states to
adopt a leadership position in Australian taxation as well
as better meet their community needs. The recent move
by the South Australian Government to introduce a tax
on banks to take advantage of the tax gap in bank
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